Weapons Research, Possible Harms, and The State’s Duties

It’s an undeniable fact that states engage in weapons research. I think many people are of the opinion that this is totally acceptable. Professor John Forge argues against that common belief in “ISIS & The Case Against Weapons Research”. I’ll be presenting one of my primary concerns with the argument momentarily, and you can see the full argument that I’m responding to here (I highly recommend reading the article before proceeding).

Here’s a very truncated version of Professor Forge’s argument:

  1. If weapons research leads to unjustified harms, it must be forbidden.
  2. If a war cannot be shown to be just, weapons research leads to unjustified harms.
  3. No one can show that a war is just in advance.
  4. Thus, weapons research must be forbidden.

I cannot find any internal flaws with the argument, but I worry that the author too narrowly restricts which moral principles ought to apply to a state’s armed activities. The main principle he discusses is the “no-harm” principle, which basically states that “it is wrong to harm others without justification” — and in this case, the justification we’re looking for is that harms prevented by weapons research (and armed interventions more generally) outweigh the harms caused. Though this is an important principle for states to adhere to, it seems like states also have a duty to guarantee the security of their citizens, especially when their country is being invaded. I’m curious to know what the author has to say about this conflict.

Eliding principles not discussed by the author, however, using the no-harm principle alone seems problematic. It seems fairly easy to invalidate it, at least in the context of the issue at hand. The argument would go thus:

  1. If permitting weapons research leads to unjustified harms, it must be forbidden.
  2. If forbidding weapons research leads to unjustified harms, it must be permitted.
  3. If some state x does not conduct weapons research and x is invaded, x’s citizens will be unjustifiably harmed.
  4. One cannot determine that a war is just, so weapons research leads to unjustified harms.
  5. Thus, weapons research must be forbidden and permitted.

This conclusion is clearly self-contradictory, and it leads us to deny the antecedents contained in premises #1 and #2. This would indicate that the no-harm principle is either invalid or, at the very least, can’t apply unqualifiedly to weapons research (and state military actions, more broadly).

The easy reply to this is that permitting weapons research leads to more unjustified harms or deaths in the long-run, as is the case with ISIS (seriously, read the original article), so the first premise ought to be retained while the second one should be jettisoned. Even granting the first half of the objection, however, does not eliminate the contradiction. As the author points out, war makes knowing things in advance very difficult. This means we can’t know in advance, with absolute certainty, that our weapons research will lead to more unjustified harms in the long-run than justified ones. However, in the case we’re imagining, it’s quite clear that if weapons research isn’t conducted, invasion will lead to extraordinary harms to their citizens. In other words, in the case we’re imagining, we know that not doing weapons research will lead to unjustified harms in the present. The contradiction remains, then.

All this being said, I’m largely sympathetic to Forge’s conclusion. I’m also aware that my thoughts here are presented all-too-briefly (which is done intentionally). That being said, I’d love to hear other people’s thoughts on the matter — both on the matter of the original argument, and on the matter of my response.

How To Be A Better [Blank]: Make Dumb Mistakes

As cliche as I will sound, I have to say it: in order to improve, you have to admit your mistakes. Well, I made two big mistakes when I wrote my article on whether or not police officers should be considered hate crime victims. The first mistake I made was not researching legislative or judicial commentary on hate crime laws. The second mistake I made was not spending more time fleching out the most concept-driven part of the entire article (viz. the final section). The overall result was a work whose concepts were somewhat vague and without context.

I arrived at that conclusion after taking some time to remove myself from the feedback my article received and then reflecting on said commentary. In retrospect, they are such rookie mistakes; they’re mistakes I would have tried my hardest to avoid while at Cal State Northridge. Considering the opinions of your contemporaries before putting your ideas in public is priority #1. And clearing up your ideas, especially new ones that might be controversial, is a lesson I had to learn so many times while writing papers.

It’s easy to think that after graduating, we are immune to such mistakes. It’s easy to forget that when you’re not in an environment explicitly expecting thoroughness in thought and rigor in writing, those habits will easily fall by the wayside. It’s easy to forget that we’re human, and mistakes should always be expected. It’s easy to think that when you receive such flak, you are not as intelligent as you once believed.

My gut reaction, in the face of such glaring errors, was to deride my own intelligence. But that’s not how intelligence works. My good friend, Daniel, reminded me that intelligence is a process. It’s never instantaneous. Which is why, despite my glaring errors, I’m not giving up on the hate crime project. I don’t plan on deleting the original post. I’ll need that post for when I clear up the ideas and double check my initial counter-arguments against the FOP. My new plan is to do the relevant legislative and judicial research, understand the context of hate crime laws, and clear up my conceptual proposals.

Usually a reflective post ends with an equally reflective conclusion. Well, you’ll find no such thing here. Good day to you zir*.


*No, that was not a typo.

Police Officers Should Never Be Considered Hate Crime Victims

I’ve heard the Fraternal Order of Police assert the following three times now: police officers should be a protected group under 18 U.S. Code § 249, the law establishing what constitutes a hate crime. My immediate reaction is to dismiss their suggestion out of hand, but every idea deserves a fair hearing. Let’s see what the FOP wants, why they want it, and whether they have good reasons for wanting it.

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Coming (Philosophical) Attractions

My following on here is not great, but is it any wonder — I hardly ever write here! Hopefully, this post highlighting some coming attractions will change that. The writing part, that is. In order of what I think will come sooner rather than later, here are the posts currently in the works.

  1. On Black Lives Matter: I am currently working on a defense of Black Lives Matter. It’s languishing a bit because it is long, requires some research, and I’m taking time to be extra charitable to the other side. Nevertheless, it is underway. It will have four parts. First, I’ll explain what Black Lives Matter stands for, what their goals are, and how they mean to accomplish those goals. Second, I’ll address some common objections to Black Lives Matter’s objectives, cause, and rhetoric. The sources of the objections range from internet articles, things I’ve heard on the news, and things my friends have said. Third, I will mount a positive, socio-political argument explaining why Black Lives Matter is necessary. Fourth, I will present a very brief moral argument for why convinced readers should support Black Lives Matter, along with some ideas for how they can do that. The latter will be borrowed from members of the movement, as I would not presume to know the best courses of action qua white male who hasn’t joined the actual organization. The third and fourth parts will be the most philosophical, and as such will take the longest to complete.
  2. On Hate Crimes: I have heard it said a few times by the Fraternal Order of Police that police officers ought to be protected under hate crime laws. Given recent shootings, it is understandable why they would make this claim. Nevertheless, I think they are mistaken. In this post, I will do four things. First, I will explain the current hate crime laws. Second, I will explain and refute the FOP’s stated arguments. Third, I will construct an enhanced defense of their position using my journal article on discrimination. Fourth, I will delineate a social meta-narrative latent in hate crime laws. I’ll demonstrate that police officers are precluded by this latent meta-narrative, thus concluding that police officers cannot be hate crime victims even on the enhanced FOP position.
  3. On My Post-Bachelor Relationship with Philosophy: This will be a distinctly non-theoretical, very personal piece. In short, I’ll examine how my relationship with philosophy is different now compared to when I was in college, how I feel about that, and how I’m navigating philosophy qua individual-in-the-private-sector. I hope to close with some remarks on what it means to live a philosophical life and to truly love wisdom.
  4. On Social Epistemology: Social epistemology is concerned with how we come to know things via social means. I’m currently reading Social Epistemology: Essential Readings with my good friend, Daniel Diaz. I’m going to work out a plan with him for writing on some of the readings in the anthology. If his schedule allows it, these will likely be collaborative works.

That’s what I’m up to in a nutshell. I can’t provide any solid posting dates, but I will update on their status as I go along. Perhaps I’ll include some personalized commentary that will incidentally help me process my third writing project.

For anyone who reads this, your thoughts on any of these subjects is more than welcome, as that will help the thinking and writing process. Until next time. 🙂

Religious Freedom and Birth Control: A Reflection

It is now a common occurrence: some religious organization claims that by being required to provide birth control, their ability to practice their religion is inhibited because doing so rubs against their religious beliefs. What follows are some thoughts I have floating in my head about this issue.

What Are These Exemptions?

Religious accommodations are usually granted to individuals within an organization. What these organizations ask for amounts to a communal religious accommodation. This is significant. The impact of communal accommodations will naturally extend beyond that of an individual’s exemption. In particular, it will affect people who are both directly and indirectly associated with the organization, by which I mean this: a married woman will not only be affected by the organization’s refusal to provide birth control. Her husband will be, too. Furthermore, depending on the couple’s financial circumstances, it might affect other members of the family at large.

Some Ethical Issues

It’s worth wondering whether imposing the requirement to provide birth control, for example, truly amounts to an inhibition upon the person’s ability to practice their religion. There’s no sense in which this requirement would stop a Catholic from going to Mass on Sunday, accepting Communion, praying, etc.

What’s going on instead is a violation of conscience. That is, they are forced to do something they feel is wrong in virtue of their religious beliefs. Furthermore, it could be that the individuals employed by the organization not only feel it’s wrong for them to use birth control, but feel it’s wrong to enable others to do the same insofar as doing so is within their immediate power.

In terms of how we commonly understand the phenomenon of conscience violation, this isn’t strange. If one believes murder is wrong, they would certainly be violating their conscience if they enabled someone to commit homicide. The same can be said for a person who believes birth control is wrong. If avoiding violating their religiously-influenced conscience is indeed integral to their ability to practice their religion, then it seems the requirement to provide birth control amounts to an inhibition.

Even if we were to admit that conscience violation does amount to an inhibition against practicing their religion, we do not thereby have a reason to exempt religious organizations (or organizations that honor/promote certain religious values) from providing birth control to employees or beneficiaries (e.g. people who live in shelters). For example, suppose the CEO of some business belonged to a religion that required them to make job candidates fight to the death in order to determine who should be employed. Imposing legal penalties upon said person would inhibit their ability to fully practice their religion, but surely such restrictions are legally and morally warranted. This makes it clear that violation of conscience does not always amount to a good reason to allow an exemption.

The question is whether or not the violation of conscience involved in providing someone with birth control is something worth protecting, morally speaking. I think there are three serious problems involved.

  1. The single act of preventing someone from obtaining birth control inhibits them from exercising their own judgment in a very significant area of their lives. Their autonomy, in other words, is restricted to some degree. If autonomy is considered a moral good, preventing someone from obtaining birth control would amount to a moral wrong.
  2. The effect this prevention might have on people’s lives is also worth considering. Given the effectiveness of man-made prophylactics, and the relative ineffectiveness of methods such as ‘rhythm’ and ‘pulling out’, couples will always run a huge risk whenever they have sex without access to synthetic measures. Someone could always counter, “well, don’t have sex unless you’re planning on having a baby”, but as anyone who’s ever had sex knows, that’s both difficult to do and entails harmful consequences for the couple’s relationship. Furthermore, the financial consequences for the couple, their extended family, and even the child could be horrendous given the right circumstances.
  3. Is it reasonable to expect someone who doesn’t share in your religious convictions to act in a way consistent with said convictions? It doesn’t seem like it. From the non-believer’s standpoint, they have no reason to do so simply because they don’t subscribe to your beliefs. This isn’t to say there isn’t any objective reason for them to do so, merely that they do not see any such reasons. Put another way, if they believe there are objective reasons to act in a certain way, they do not believe those reasons entail refraining from using birth control. Thus, they cannot be expected, practically speaking, to act in a way entailed by some other set of reasons. Is it morally permissible to force someone to act in a way contrary to the reasons they recognize? In cases such as murder, of course. However, in cases like these it’s less clear. The two problems cited above might lead us to answer “no”.

Some Social & Political Issues

We’ve already noted that, refusing to do provide birth control impinges upon the self-determination of others. In other words, exercising one’s religious beliefs, in this case, necessarily entails inhibiting others from determining the course of at least one significant part of their lives. One might then wonder if we have crossed a line from protecting religious beliefs to enabling their enforcement upon those who do not ascent to those beliefs. In fact, I believe it is fairly clear that this is exactly what’s happening, at least in a limited sense.

In permitting those who believe that birth control is sinful to not give it to their employees, they make at least some employees behave as if they also believed in birth control’s sinfulness. This is enough to warrant the charge that a certain set of religious beliefs are being enforced. After all, when a state forces its citizens to practice a certain religion, that is what’s happening: they are forcing people to act as if they believed certain things. Hence, it’s the case that exempting an organization from providing birth control on religious grounds is actually an act of enforcing some religious belief.

Exempting certain organizations from providing birth control to employees or immediate beneficiaries on religious grounds also clashes with America’s professed story about personhood. Adhering to liberalism, Americans see themselves as individuals first and foremost. Among other things, this means they have the ability and right to make their own decisions. As such, adhering to the requirements or beliefs of any given group is up to them, and not the group itself. Taking this into consideration, it’s easy to see how the case we’ve been considering clashes with the story we tell about people. In permitting certain organizations to withhold birth control on religious grounds, we effectively deny individuals the ability to partake in America’s professed story about personhood in at least one area of their lives. This means they are denied the right to self-determination that they supposedly have under America’s philosophical narrative. Put another way, these organizations are given permission to undermine America’s professed story about personhood, at least in a limited sense. Given our judicial system’s long-standing stare decicis tradition, that is troubling indeed; setting up this kind of legal precedent could have significant consequences for the future.

I’ll likely add more to this later, and make it a little bit easier to understand, too. In the meantime, for those of you who were able to track with me, what do you think of all this? Do you have any criticisms or anything you’d like to add? Comments are always welcome!

Sex-Segragated Bathrooms: Any Good Reasons?

That’s the question I’m asking in response to TIME’s “Why Do We Have Men’s and Women’s Bathrooms Anyway?”. The question they ask is a mostly historical one. The question I’m asking is a philosophical one, although I will talk about the history by way of a starting point.

America instituted sex-segregated restrooms during the 1800’s. Their reasoning, according to professor Terry Kogan, was rooted in a deep-seated sexism.

Women, policymakers argued, were inherently weaker and still in need of protection from the harsh realities of the public sphere….with the advent of indoor bathrooms that were then in the process of replacing single-person outhouses, separate loos soon followed….[Ladies’ rooms] were adopted to create this protected haven in this dangerous public realm

According to Maya Rhodan, separate facilities persist due primarily to building codes. That doesn’t mean, however, that philosophical reasons are never given for their persistence. When confronted with the idea of eliminating sex-segregated bathrooms, two North Carolina lawmakers worried about the impact such a decision would have on women’s safety and privacy.

This sounds suspiciously similar to the reasoning of the 1800’s, but let’s leave that alone for now. The question we’re concerned with is whether or not we have any good philosophical reason to keep sex-specific bathrooms around. Let’s consider some.

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Missing CSUN, My Philosophical Home

Today, I attended California State University, Northridge’s — my alma mater — VII Annual Student Philosophy conference. The conference ran from about 9:00 in the morning till 4:30 in the afternoon. I had only planned to stay for a few hours, as I have quite a few impending due dates for my freelance work. Well, that plan didn’t work out. I stayed for the whole thing. I became engrossed in the discussions; I had fun catching up with former classmates and professors; and, of course, I didn’t want to work. I still don’t want to work.

More than anything, I stayed because I miss my philosophical home.

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Racial Tensions at Duke University (Commentary Forthcoming)

A sit-in at Duke University entered its fourth day on Monday, as students occupied an administrative building to call for three school officials to resign and for Duke to offer a $15 minimum wage for campus workers. The nine students who started the sit-in were largely protesting Tallman Trask III, Duke’s executive vice president, over…

via Duke Students Occupy Administration Building in Racially Charged Protest — TIME